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F ebrua ry , 1 995A bs tr act : In this pap e rw e study the e ndo genous form ati o n of co op eration
structures or com m unic at i o n gra phs b et w een pl ay ers i n a sup eradd i tiv eT U
ga m e. F o r eac hc oo pe ra ti o n struct u re that is form e d, the pa y o￿ s to the p l a y e rs
are determ ined b y an exog e no usly giv en so l ution. W em od e l the pro ce ss of
co o p eration structure fo rm at i on as a g am ei n strategic fo rm .I ti ss h o wn that
sev eral eq uili brium re￿nem e n ts predic t the form ation o f the c om plete co op e r-
ation struc tu r eo rs o m e structure whic hi sp a y o￿- e quiv ale n t to the c om pl ete
structure. These results a re obta i ned fo r a l arg e c las s o f solutions for co op-
erativ eg a m es wi th co o p eration struct ur e s. A b y - pro duc t of o ur a naly si si sa
c ha racte rization o f the cl a s so fw e igh ted My erson v alue s.1
1 In tro duc ti on
Usuall y , c oo pe ra ti v eg a m e the or y i s concerned with pre dicti ng ho w rationa l
pla y ers wil ld i s tri bute the gains tha t are obtained throug h c o o p eration. T he
sta ndard a pproa c h in the li terature is to re presen t the underl ying s i tua ti on as
ag a m ei nc hara c teristi c funct ion fo rm .A sol ution c onc ep t spe c i￿es the dis-
tri b uti on of p a y o￿ s for eac hg a m e . This form ul at i o n (us uall y) e ither i m pl ici tly
as sum e s that the gra nd coa l iti o n wil lf o r m ,o rs p e ci￿e sa nex o g enou s coali tion
structure. H o w ev er, the distributi on of p a y o￿ s w i ll dep end on the structure o f
coalit ion s whi c h form ,s i nce thi sw i ll t ypi call y dete rm ine the total am oun t that
is a v ailable fo r distri bution. M or e o v er , the ev en tual coali tiona l structure i tself
wil l u suall y b e in￿uence db y wha t pla y ers ex pe ct to get in di￿eren t coa l iti o ns.
He nce, the i deal appro ac h is one i nw h i c h the c o ali tion structure a s w e ll a s the
distri bu ti on of pa y o￿ s a re d e term i ned simul tane ously.
It is na tural i n thi s con te xt to a dopt the s o-call ed Nash pr o gr am , and try
and supp ort the predi ction o f an ye nd ogenou s theory of coa l iti o n form ation
and as so c iated s oluti o n concept as a non c oo pe r at i v ee q uili brium outcom eo f
a ‘ l a r g e r ’ ga m ei nw h i c h the nego t iation pro c ess i se m b edded. Since the sem -
inal w o rk o f Rubinstei n (1 982 ), there h a v eb e e nan um b er o f p ap ers in thi s
traditi on . Of pa rti cul ar r e le v a nce for presen t purp oses are B inm ore (1 98 5),
Cha tte rjee et al. (1 993 ), G ul (198 9), P e rry a nd Ren y (19 94) and Sel ten (1 98 1),
where the nego ti at i o n pro c ess a sso ci at e dw i th c h aracteri stic f un c tion g am e si s
e x plic itl ym ode ll ed. Wh i le G ul (1 989 ) and P erry and Ren y (1 994 ) deri v e d ne-
go ti at i o n pro cesses leading up to sp eci ￿c so l ution con c epts (the Sha pl ey v alue
and the c o re resp ecti v e ly ), Cha tte rjee et al. (19 93) form ul at e d a generali zation
of the Rubinstein a l ternating o￿ ers m o del to repre se n t the nego ti at ion pro ce ss .
Am o ngst other result s , the ya l so sh o w e d that the g rand c o ali tion ne ed n ot a l -
w a ys form ev en i n s tri ctl y sup e ra ddi tiv e gam es. Of cou rse , all these pap e rs2
pro vi de a n endog enous the o ry of coa l iti o n fo rm at i on as w e ll as a predic tion
ab out t he d i stribution o f pa y o ￿s.
1
There a re t w o p oin ts o f departu r e from this l ite ra ture in the c urren t pa p er.
Fi rs t, w ef o c us atten ti o n on My erson’s (1 97 7) c o op er at i on structu r es
2
, ra the r
than coa l iti o n structure s. A c o o p eration structure is a gra ph who se v e rtic es
are iden t i￿ed w i th the pla y ers. A l ink b e t w e en t w o pla y ers m eans that the se
pla y ers can carry o n m ean i ng ful direc t nego ti at i o ns with eac h other. N ot i ce
that a c o ali tion structure i sas p e ci al k i nd of c oo pe r at i on st r uc ture w he re t w o
m e m b ers i and j a re link ed i f a nd on l yi f they are in the sam ec o ali tion.
3
Sec o nd, foll o wing A um an n and M y e rs on (1 98 8), w em o del s i tua ti o ns in whic h
the e v e n tua l distri bu ti on o f pa y o ￿s is dete rm i ne di ntwo distinc t sta ges or
p erio ds . Th e ￿rs t p eri o d is dev ot e dt o l i nk fo rm at i on only . During this p er io d,
the pl a y e rs cann ot e n ter i n to bindi ng agreem en ts of an yk ind, e ither o n the
natu r e of the li nk form ation, or o n the s ubseq ue n t div ision of pa y o￿ s. In the
second pe rio d, no new li nks can b e form e d, b ut pl a y e rs ne g otiate o v er the
div ision of the pa y o￿ , giv en the co o p eration structure whic h has f or m ed in the
￿rst s tage.
The goa l of thi s pap er is to a naly s e the endog e no us f or m at i o n o f co op eration
structures i n this setti ng . I n o rde r to do this, w e as sum e tha t in the ￿rst stag e
of the ab o v e pro c ess, a gen ts ’ deci sions on whether or not to f or m a l ink wi th




See also Se ngupta and Sengupt a (199 4), who dete rm i ne the coa liti on stru cture a nd
distributio no fp a y o￿s s i m ul tane o us l y ,a l th o ugh not i n the traditi on of the Na s h program .
2
See v an den Nou w el and (199 3) fo r a sur v e y of rec en t r es ea rc ho n gam es w i th c o oop e ratio n
str uctur es .
3
Aum ann and My ers on ( 1 988) g iv e exam pl e s of ne go tiati on situatio ns whi c h c an b e m od -
ell ed b y coo pe ra tion struc ture s, but no tb yc o ali tion s truc ture s.
4
Thi sg a m ew as o ri gina ll yi n tro duc ed b yM y e rson ( 1 991) (p. 44 8). Se e al s o Hart and K urz
(198 3), who discus s a sim il ar s trategic-fo r m gam ei n the con text of the e ndog e nous fo rm atio n
of coal iti on stru cture s. In c on t rast, Aum ann and My e rson (19 88) m o del the pr o ces s o fl i nk3
form ation g am e , eac h pla y er ann ounces a set of pl a y er sw i th w hom he o r s he
w an ts to fo rm a li nk .A l ink i sf o r m ed b et w een i an d j i f bot h p l a y e rs w an t
the li nk. Gi v e n the a nnoun c em e n ts of the n pl a y e rs, this sp eci ￿cation giv es the
co o p eration structure. Supp os e there is a r ul eo rs o l ution wh i c hd e term i nes a
distri bu ti on o f pa y o￿s fo r eac h c oo pe ra ti on structure. This, then, also giv es the
pa y o￿ f un c tion of the stra te gi c form g am e .S i nce this is a w e ll -d e ￿n e d strategic
form g am e ,w e c an u s e an y nonco op e ra ti v ee quil ibri um co nc ept to a naly s e the
ga m e.
Supp ose n o w that the ru l ew h i c hd e term ines pa y o ￿s for eac h co op eration
structure ha s the prop ert y that no ag e n tw an t s to unil at e ra l ly br e ak al i nk wi th
an y pla y er. Since no pla y er w an ts to bre a kal i nk, and it nee ds the c o nsen t
of two p l a y ers to fo rm an a dditi on al l ink, an y co op eration structure c an b e
sus tai ne da sa N as h e q uili brium .W e, therefore, use re￿nem en ts of the Nash
eq uili brium concept. I n pa rti cul ar , w ee m plo y un dom i na te d Nash equi libri um ,
coalit ion -pro of equi libri um , a nd the arg m ax s e t of we ighte dp oten tial ga m es.
5
Our pri ncipal c on c lusion is that for a wide class o f s ol ut i on s, th e se eq uili brium
re￿ne m en ts a l ll e a d to the form ation of the full c o o p eration s truc tu r e or co op-
eration s truc tures whi c ha r ep ayo ￿- e quiv alen t to this structure. An im p orta n t
b y - pro duc t of ou r ana l ysis is a c ha racte rizati on of weig hte dM yerson v a l ues
whic h are a generali zation of w ei gh te d Shapley v alue st og a m es wi th co o p era-
ti o n struc tu re s. W e sho w that w e igh ted My erso n v al ues are t h e only so l ution
conce p ts fo r ga m es wi th co o p eration structurs wh i c hs a t i sfy a n e￿c ienc yr e-
qui rem e n t and whic h gene ra te l inki ng g am e s tha t a re w e igh ted p oten ti al gam es.
The p l a n of thi s pap e ri s as foll o ws . In secti on 2 w e pro vi de so m e b asic
de￿ni tions , inc luding those o f co o p eration s truc tu r es and soluti on s f or g am es
with c o o p eration structures. Som e‘ reaso nable’ prop erti es on su c hs o l utions
fo rm atio na sa g a m eo fp erf e ct i nf or mation.W ed i sc uss this issue in m ore det a il i n s ec ti on 3.
5
The la tt er is de￿n ed i n s ec ti on 5.4
are in tro duced, and s om ei m pl ications are deri v e d. Sec tion 3 con tains a dis-
cussion o f di ￿ ere n tw a ys o f m o del li ng the pro c ess of li nk form ation. E ndoge-
nou s c o op erati o n structures c o rre s p ond i ng to undom inated N as h e q uili brium
andc o ali tion- pro o f N a sh equi libri um a re d e term ined in secti on 4. Secti on 5
con tains th e c ha r a cte riz at i on of w ei gh ted My e rso n v al ues, and also sho ws that
the arg m ax se t o f the w eigh te d p oten ti a l corresp onds to the ful l co op eration
structure and pa y o ￿-equi v al en t structures. W e conclude i ns e ction 6 .
2 C o op eration S tr u ctures and Solutions
Let (N; v)b ea TU c o ali tiona l ga m e, where N = f1; 2 ;: ::;n g de n otes the ￿nite
pla y er s e t and v is a real-v alued function on the fa m ily 2
N
of all subs e ts o f N
with v (;) = 0. Thr oug ho u t this p ap er , w e wil l as su m e that v is s up er a dditiv e
6
.
A c o op er ation str uc tur e is a g raph g =( N; L )w h e re N is the set of v erti ces,
and L is the e dge set .A n edg e wi ll also b e c al led a l ink , and denoted b y l; l
0
etc . F or a n y S ￿ N ,w es a y tha t pla y ers i ;j 2 S ar e c onne ct e d in S if there
ex ists a path f ro m i to j tha t uses only v erti ces in S . The relation ‘ connecte d
in N ’ i sa ne quiv ale nce rel at i on on N .T h e e quiv ale nce classes of t hi sr e lation
are the c onn e cte dc om p one nts o f the gra ph g .
W e foll o w Aum a nn and My erso n (1 98 8) i ni n te rpreti n gal ink b et w een t w o
pla y ers as m ean i ng tha t these p l a y e rs can c a rry on m e a ningful dire ct ne g otia-
ti on s wi th e ac h o the r. The negotiation to form li nks tak es pl ac ei na p r e lim -
inary p eri o d when \for o ne reas on or an other, one c a nnot en te ri n to bi nding
ag re em e n ts o f an yk ind (su c h as those rel at i ng to su bseq uen td i visions o f the
pa y o ￿.. )" .
7
A so l ution is a m a ppi ng ￿ whic ha s s i g n sa ne lem en ti nI R
n
to eac h TU
6
v is sup eradditi v e if for al l S; T 2 2
N
with S \ T = ;;v ( S )+ v ( T ) ￿ v ( S [T ).
7
Aum ann and My ers on ( 1 988), page 18 7. Se e al so M y e rson (19 77).5
ga m e( N; v ) an d co op e ra ti on structure g =( N; L ). Sinc e the re wi ll b e no
am bi gu i t y ab o ut the underl yi n g ga m e( N; v), w e wil l sim pl y writ e ￿ (L);￿ ( L
0
) ,
etc ., i ns te ad o f wr i ting ￿ (N; v ; L ) ;￿ ( N; v ; L
0
), e tc.
A sol ution c a n fo r ex am ple b e gene ra te d for an y gra ph g b y apply ing
the usua l o r f am i li ar c oo pe r at i v e s oluti on c o nce pts to the ‘ g raph- re st ricte d
ga m e’ (N; v
g
). This ga m e is de￿ned as fo l lo ws. Let S ng denote the p arti tion
of S i n to subsets o f pla y ers tha t are connecte di nS b y g . Tha t i s,
S n g = ffi j j and i are connecte di n S b y g gj j 2 S g (1)









T 2 S n g
v ( T ) (2)
F or instan c e, fora n yg =( N; L ), the S haple yv al ue of the a sso ci ated g am e
(N ; v
g
) i s a solution for (N; v ; L ), a nd has co m e to b e call ed the M ye r son val ue.
8
Sim il a rl y , w e igh ted My e rso n v alue so f ( N; v ; L ) a re the w eigh te d Sha pl ey v al ues
of ( N ; v
g
).
A class o f so l utions w hi c hw i ll pl ay a prom ine n t role in this pap er is the
cl a ss s ati sf y ing the fol lo wing ‘ reaso nable’ pro p erti es on a so l ution ￿ b elo w.
Com p onen te ￿cie ncy (CE) :F or all c o op erati o n s truc tures (N; L ) and all
S 2 2
N





(L )= v ( S ).
W eak l ink s y m m e try (WLS) :F or all i ;j 2 N , and al l c oo pe ra ti o n struc-
tures (N; L ), i f ￿
i
(L [f i; j g) >￿
i
( L ) , then ￿
j
(L [f i; j g) >￿
j
( L ).
Im pro v em en t prop er t y (IP) :F or a l l i ;j 2 N and a l l co o p eration struc tu r es
(N; L ) , i f f or so m e k 2 N nfi; j g ;￿
k
( L [f i; j g) >￿
k
( L ), then ￿
i









My er so n (1977 )c o n tains a characte ri z ati on of the My e rson v a lue. Se e al so Ja ckson a nd
W ol insky (199 4).6
These pro p erti es a l lh a v ev ery si m ple i n ter pr e ta ti on s. C om po ne n t e￿c ie nc y ,
w h i c hw a s originall yu s e db yM y erso n (19 77), sta te s that the pla y ers in a
connecte d com p onen t S spli t the v alue v (S )a m ong st the m sel v e s . The second
prop ert yi sa v e ry w eak form of sym m etry .I t s a ys that if a new li nk b e t w ee n
pla y ers i an d j m ak es i st r ic tly be tter o ￿, then it m us t also stric tly im pro v e
the pa y o￿ of pla y er j . Finall y , the im pr o v em en t p rop ert y sta te s that i fan e w
li nk b e t w e en pla y ers i an d j strictl yi m pro v e s the pa y o￿ of a n y other pla y er k ,
then the pa y o￿ of e ither i or j m ust also s tri ctl yi m pro v e.
The cl as s of weig hte dM y er son val ues satis￿es all the p rop ertie sl i sted ab o v e.
There are al s o o thers. F o r instance, i f( N; v )i sac onv ex ga m e, then the e g ali-
taria n solut io n of Dutta a nd Ra y ( 19 89 ) c o rre spon d i ng to the a sso ci at e dg a m e
( N ; v
g
) a l s o s a t i s ￿ e s t he se pro p erti es.
The three prop er ties tog ethe ri m pl ya ni n teresti ng fourth prop ert y .T h i si s
t h ec o n t e n to fthe nex tl em m a.
L e m m a1 L et ￿ b e any solu tion s at is fying CE, W LS and I P . Then , for al l
i; j 2 N; and a ll c o o p er ation struct ur es (N; L ) ,
￿
i
( L [ f i ; j g ) ￿ ￿
i
( L ) : ( 3 )




( L [f i ;j g ).




(L [f i; j g ). But then, since









( L [f i; j g )
and ￿
j
(L ) ￿ ￿
j
(L [f i; j g).
Re m ark 1: W e wil l denote the prop ert y incorp orated in e qua ti o n (3) b y
Li n k Monotonic ity. Note t h at Link Mono tonic it y is an app e al ing pro p ert yi n
it so wn righ t. It sa ys tha t a pla y er i sho ul d n ot be w ors e - o ￿a sa r e su l to f7
form i n g a new li nk with s om ep l a y e r j .
9
Re m ark 2: I ti se a sy to con struc te xam ple st o s h o w tha t the Com p onen t
E￿c ienc y ,W eak Link Sym m etry ,a n d I m pro v e m en t pro p erti es are i ndep e nden t.
Another c o nseq ue nce o f the s e three pro p erti es i sd e riv ed i n the ne xt le m m a.
W e s ho w tha t i f the form ation of a l ink fi; j g a￿ e cts the pa y o￿ of so m e o the r
pla y er k ,t h e ni tm ust a l so a￿ e c t the pa y o ￿s of b oth pl a y e rs that form e d the
new li nk. T hi s prop e rt y wil lb e u s e dl at e r on in the pa p er.
Le m m a2 L et ￿ s at i sfy CE, W LS an d IP. Then , for al l i ;j 2 N , and al l
c o op er ation structu r es ( N; L ) , if for some k 2 N nfi; j g, ￿
k
(L [f i ;j g ) 6 = ￿
k
( L ) ,
then ￿
i
(L [f i; j g ) 6= ￿
i
(L ) and ￿
j
(L [f i ;j g ) 6 = ￿
j
( L ) .
P r o o f : S u p p o se for so m e i; j 2 N and k 2 N nfi ;j g , ￿
k
( L[ f i ;j g ) 6 = ￿
k
( L ) . I f
￿
k
( L [ f i ;j g ) >￿
k
( L ) , t hen f ro m WLS and IP w em ust ha v e ￿
i
(L [ fi ;j g ) >
￿
i
( L ) a n d ￿
j
( L [ f i ;j g ) >￿
j
( L ) .
S u pp os e ￿
k
(L [f i; j g) <￿
k
( L ). F rom W LS, e ither ￿
i
(L [f i; j g) >￿
i
( L ) and
￿
j
( L [f i; j g ) >￿
j
( L ), o r ￿
i




( L [f i ;j g ) ￿ ￿
j
( L ). But,
in the l at ter c a se, CE a nd s up eradditi vit yi m ply that there ex ists a l 62 fi; j g
suc h tha t ￿
l
(L [f i; j g) >￿
l
( L ). T hi sw ould v iolate I P ,s oi tm us t ho l d that
￿
i
(L [f i; j g) >￿
i
( L ) and ￿
j
(L [f i ;j g ) >￿
j
( L ). This e s tabli sh e st h e l e m m a.
Whil e the thre e prop ertie s are a l l a pp ealing a nd a re sa ti s￿ed b y a larg e
cl a ss of s oluti o ns, there a re o ther soluti on s o ut s i de this cl a ss tha t see mt o b e
app eali ng . One suc h solution is de￿ned b e lo w.
F or a n y i an d L; le t L
i
= ffi; j gjj 2 N; f i; j g2L g , the s e to fl inks that




j .L e t S
i
( L )d e no te the connecte dc om p onen to f
9
Note that the gam ei s sup e raddi tiv e.8
L con ta i ning i . Then, the Pr op ortional Link s S o l ution,d e n oted ￿
P






















( L )) if jS
i
(L)j￿ 2




for all L and all i 2 N . The soluti on ￿
P
cap ture s the no ti o n tha t the m or e
l i n k s a p l a y e r has with o ther pla y ers, the b e tter a re hi s r e lativ e prosp e cts i n
the s ubseq ue n tn e g otiations o v er the div ision of the pa y o￿ . Noti ce th at thi s
m ak es se n se only when the pla y ers are equall y‘ p o w erful ’ in the ga m e( N; v ).
Otherwi se ,abig pl a y e rm a y get m o re tha n smal l pla y ers e v e n if h e has few e r
li nks. W el ea v ei t to the re ad e rt o c hec k tha t ￿
P
sa ti s￿es C E and IP , but not
WL S.
3 Mo d elling Negotiat i o n Pro ce ss es
In this secti on , w e us e the 3-p e rs on m a jorit y gam et o i ll us trate som e of the
issues in v ol v ed i n the endog e no us f or m at i o n o f co o p eration structure s. I n par-
ti cular, w e discuss the Aum ann-My e rso n ex tensiv e form app r oa c hi ns o m e de-
tail .W e p oin t o ut that thi s a pproa c h, whic hi n v ol v e sa se q uen tial form ation o f
li nks m a y b e appro pri at e i n s i tua ti o ns where the ne g otiation pro c ess is ‘ pub l ic ’,
and where fo r one re a son o r ano the r, bil at e ra l nego ti at i o ns tak e place i ns o m e
prede term i ned ord e r. Wh e n these prere quisi t e s ar e n ot m et, i tm a yb em or e
app ropriate to m od e l the ‘ne g otiation g am e ’a s ag a m ei n strategic f or m .T h i s
i s the a pproac h a dopted in th i s pap e r, a nd it is de￿ned m ore f or m al ly later on
in thi s secti on .
Aum an n and My erson (1 988 ) u se the fol lo wing ex tensiv e form . First, an
ex o genous r ul e dete rm ine s the seque n tial o rder in whic h p airs of pl a y ers ne go -
ti a te to form a l ink . Al ink i s form e di f a nd only i f b oth p oten tial partn e rs
ag re e, a nd o nc e form e d, a link cannot b e brok en. Moreo v er, a f ter the l as t pa i r9
in th e ord e rh a sd e cide d o n whethe r o r not to form a li nk, all th e rem ai ning
pairs are giv en a nother o pp o rtuni t y to form a l ink. T he pro c ess stops if all
pairs that did no t fo rm a li nk y et ha v e ha d a last op p ortun i t y t od os o . A t
a n y poi n to ft i m e , the en t ire hi s tory of li nks fo rm ed or rejec ted is kno wn to the
pla y ers, so tha t it is a g am e of p erfec ti nfo rm at i o n. Som e co o p eration gra ph g





is, the Shaple yv al ue of p l a y er i i n the ga m e v
g
.
Since the gam ei s￿ n i te an d of p erfe ct inform ation, it ha s su bgam ep e rfec t
eq uili bria i n pure stra te gi es. The ‘pre di cti on ’ o f t he m o del i s tha t only co op e r-
ation structure s ass o ciated with subg am e p erfe ct equi libri a wil l actually f or m
as a result o f negotiations b et w een pla y ers.
Co nside r, for instan c e, the T U g am e v on the pl a y e rs e tf 1 ; 2 ; 3 g de￿ne db y






1 i f j S j￿ 2
0 o therwi se
Supp ose also tha t the rule sp eci ￿es tha t the order of pa i rs is f1; 2g; f1; 3 g; f2 ; 3g.
Then, the A um a nn-My erson predi ction i s tha t o nl y one pa i r wil lf o r m a l ink.
Supp ose the l ink f1; 2g is fo rm ed. Notic e that eithe r o f1a n d2g a i nb yf o r m ing
an additi o nal li nk with 3 , pr ovide d the o the rp l a y e r do es not fo rm a li nk w i th 3 .
Tw o further p oin ts need to b e noted. First, i fp l a y e ri form sal ink with 3, the n
it i si n the i n terest of j (j 6= i) to also l ink up w i th 3. Second, if al l l inks a re
form ed, the n pla y ers 1 a nd 2 are w orse-o ￿ com pared to the graph in whic h they
alone form a li nk. Henc e, the structure ff1 ; 2gg i s s ustained as a n ‘ equi libri um ’
b yap a i ro f m u tual threats o f the ki nd :
\I fy ou fo rm a li nk w i th 3, the ns ow i ll I ."
Of cours e , thi sk i n d of threat m ak e s sense only i f i wil l com et o kn o w wh e ther j
has form ed a li nk wi th 3. Moreo v e r, i can acquir e thi s inform ati on on l yi f the
nego t iation pro ce ss i s pub lic .I f b i lateral ne g otiations are conducted s e cretl y ,10
then i tm a yb ei nt h e i n te rest o f som e pair to conceal th e fa c t tha t the yh a v e
f o r m ed a l ink un ti l the p r o cess o f bil at e ra l ne g otiations has c om e to a n end.
It i sa l so c l ear tha t i f di￿ere n tp a i rs ca n c a rry o ut negotiations s imul tane ousl y
andi f l i nk so n c e form e d canno t b e bro k en, then the m utual th r ea ts referre dt o
earli er canno t b e carrie d out.
1 0
Th us, there a re m an y con tex ts where cons i derations o the r than threats m a y
ha v ea ni m p o rtan ti n￿ ue nce on the form ation o f l inks. F or i nsta nce , s up po se
pla y ers 1 a nd 2 ha v e alre a dy form ed a li nk am ong st them sel v es. Su pp os e also
that nei th e r pla y er ha s as y et started negotiations w i th pla y er 3 . If 3 starts
nego t iations simultan e ously with b oth 1 and 2, then 1 and 2 a re i nf a c t face d
with a Prisone r s’ Dile mm a situation. T os e e thi s, deno te l and nl a s the
stra t eg i es of form i n gal i n k with 3 a nd not fo r m ing a link with 3 resp e ctiv el y .
Then, the pa y o ￿s to 1 a nd 2 are descri be db y th e foll o wi ng m at r ix (the ￿rst
en try in eac h b o xi s 1 ’ sp a y o ￿, while th e s e con d en try is 2 ’ sp a y o￿ ) .
P l a y er 2




























Note that l , that is form ing a l ink wi th 3, i sa dominant strategy for b oth
pla y ers! Ob v ious l y , the c om plete g raph m a yw el l form s i m ply b e caus e pla y ers 1
and 2 ca nnot s i gn a b i nding agreem en t to absta i nf r o m form i n gal ink with 3.
In this pap e r, w em od e l the ne g otiation pro cess as a ga m e in strategic
form . The sp eci ￿c stra te gi c form ga m e that w e wil lc o nstruct w as ￿rs t de ￿n e d
b yM y erson (1 991 ), and has su bseq uen tl y b een us e db y Qin (1 99 3). This m o del
is descri be db e l o w.
1 0
Aum ann a nd M y er son (198 8) al so stre ss the i m p ortanc e o f p erfec t info rm atio ni n der i ving
the i r r esults.11
Le t ￿ b e a soluti on . Th e n, the l ink ing game ￿( ￿ ) as so ciated with ￿ i s
giv en b y the (n + 2)- tupl e( N ; S
1




) w h e re for eac h i 2 N , S
i
i s



















( L ( s )) (5)









g ( 6 )
The i n terpre ta ti o n o f (5 ) a nd (6 ) is straigh tforw ard. A t y pical stra te gy of
pla y er i i n￿ ( ￿ )c o nsists of the s e to fp l a y ers with whom i w an ts to fo rm a
li nk. Then (6) s tates tha t a li nk b et w een i an d j is fo rm ed i f and only i f they
b o th w an t to for m this li nk. T h us , e ac h stra te gy v ec to r s giv es ri s e to a unique





, the pa y o ￿ that ￿ asso ci at e s with the co op eration structure
L(s).
W ew i ll le t￿ s =( ￿ s
1
;: : :; ￿ s
n
)d e n ote the strategy v ector suc h that ￿ s
i
= N nfig
for a l l i 2 N , whil e
￿
L = ffi; j gj i 2N; j 2 N g = L (￿ s )d e no te s the c om pl ete
edge set on N . A co o p eration structure L i s essen tial ly c omple te for ￿ if
￿ (L)= ￿ (
￿
L ). He nc e, if L i s essen ti al ly c om plete for ￿ , but L 6=
￿
L, then the
li nks w hi c h are no t form e di nL ar e inessen ti a l in the sense tha t thei r absence
doe sn o tc h a nge the p ayo￿ ve c tor fro m tha t co rr esp onding to
￿
L.N ot i ce tha t the
prop ert yo f\ e s sen tiall yc om plete "i ss p e c i ￿c to t h e solution ￿ - a co op eration
structure L m a y b e ess e n ti al ly com pl ete for ￿ , but not fo r ￿
0
.
W en o wd e ￿ ne som ee quil ibrium c on c epts for a n y￿ ( ￿ ). These wil lb eu s e d
in sec tion 4 b el o w.
1 1
W e agai nr e m i nd t he re ader tha tw eh a v e sup pres sed the un derlyi ng TU gam e( N; v )i n
order to s i m pl ify t he notati on.12
The ￿rst eq ui li brium con c ept that w e co nsi de r is the undo m i na te d Nash
eq uili brium .F or an y i 2 N; s
i
d o m inates s
0
i




















)w i th the i nequali t yb e ing stric t for some s
￿i
.L e t S
u
i
( ￿ ) b e the se t







( ￿ ). A stra te gy
tuple s is an un do min ate d Nash e q uilib r ium of ￿( ￿ )i fsi sa N as h e q uili brium
and , m oreo v er, s 2 S
u
(￿ ).
The se con d eq ui li brium conce p t that wi l l be di scuss e di s the Co ali tion-
Pro of Nash Equil ibri um . I n o rder to d e ￿ne the con c ept of Coa l iti o n-Pro o f










, let ￿(￿; s
￿
N n T





￿ ( ￿ ; s
￿
N n T













































T h e C o a li tion- Pro of Nash Equi li br ium is de￿ned inducti v ely as fol lo ws:
In a si ng l ep l a y e rg a m e, s
￿
2 S is a Co a l ition- Pr o of Nash Eq uilib r ium (C PN E)
of ￿(￿ )i ￿s
￿
i
m axi m iz es f
￿
i
( s)o v e rS .N o w, l et ￿(￿ )b eag a m ew i th n pla y ers,
where n>1, a nd assu m e that Coa l iti o n-Pro of Nash Equil ibri ah a v eb e e n























i saC P N Eo f￿ ( ￿ )i fi ti s self -e nfo rc ing
and , m o re o v e r, there do es no t e xist a nother self -e nf or c ing strategy v e ctor s 2
S
N








) for all i 2 N .
Le tC P N E( ￿ )d e no te th e set o f CPN Eo f ￿ ( ￿ ) :
12
Notice tha t the notion o f
CPNE i ncorp ora te sak i nd o f ‘f a rsigh te d ’ thoug h t pro c ess o n the part of p l a y e rs
1 2
See B ern heim ,P el e g and W hinston (198 7) fo r disc uss i on o fC o ali tion-Pro of Nash
Equil ibrium .13
since a c o ali tion when c on tem pl at i ng a devi at i o n ta k es i n to consideration the
p o ssibi lit y o f furthe rd e viations b y s ub coa l iti o ns.
1 3
4 Eq uilibrium C o op eration Stru ctures
In this secti on , w ec hara c teriz e the sets o f equi li brium co op e ra ti o n struc tu r es
under the equi li brium conce p ts de￿ned in the prev ious secti on .
Our pri ncipal o b jecti v ei st os h o w that the equi li brium concepts de ￿ned i n
secti on 3 all l ead to ess e n tiall y com ple te co op e ra ti on structures fo r so l utions
sa ti sfying the pro p erti es t h at a re l iste di n sec tion 2.
Theore m1 Let ￿ b e a s oluti on t h at s at i s￿es CE, WL S a nd IP . Then, ￿ s i s
an und om i na te d Nash equi li brium of ￿(￿ ). Moreo v er, if s is an un dom i na te d
Nash e quil ibri um o f ￿(￿ ), then L(s)i se ss e n tiall y com ple te for ￿ .
Pro of : First, w e sho w tha t ￿ s
i
is undo m inated for all i 2 N (in fact, w ee v e n
s h o wt h a ti ti sw eakly dom i na n t).












) a n d
L
0










￿ L. A lso, i f l 2 LnL
0
, then i 2 l .




































in (7 ), w e also g e t that ￿ s i saN as h e quil ibri u m of ￿(￿ ). So ,




W em en tio n this b e cause Aum ann and My er so n (198 8) st a t e that they do not us e the
‘ u sual ,m y opi c , he re-and-no w kind of e qui li br i um condi ti on’ , but a ‘l o ok ahe ad’ one. O f
cours e, f ars i gh te dness can b e m o dell ed i nm an y di￿er en tw a ys .14
No w, w e sho w tha t L(s) is essen tiall y com ple te for a n undo m inated Nash











g o f stra te gy
















f o r all k =1 ; 2 ;: ::; K ,a n da l lj 6 = k .
Clearl y , s
K









































Supp ose (8) holds with stric t ineq ua l it y . Then, w eh a v e dem ons t ra te d the
ex istence of strat e gi es s
￿ k






















( ￿ ) , then (8)
m us t ho l d with e qualit y .T h e ni t f o l lo ws from lem m a 2 tha t the pa y o ￿ st oa l l





￿ ( L ( s
k
)) = ￿ (L (s
k ￿1
)) (10)





))=￿￿￿ = ￿ ( L (￿ s )). Henc e, if s 2 S
u
(￿ ), the n L(s)i s ess e n tial ly co m -
ple te.
Theore m2 Let ￿ b e a s oluti o n satisfyi ng C E, W LS an d I P .T h e n￿ s 2
CPNE (￿ ). Mo re o v e r, if s 2 CP N E( ￿ ), the n L(s)i s ess e n tial ly c om pl ete
for ￿ .15
Pro of :I n f a c t, w ew i ll pro v e a sli gh tl y gener al ize dv e rsion o f th e theorem




i t holds that
￿ s
T
2 CPNE (￿; s
Nn T
) and that fo r all s
￿
T
2 CP N E( ￿; s
Nn T
















). W ew i ll f ol lo w the de￿nit ion of Coa l iti o n-Pro o f
Nash Equil ibri um and pro ce ed b y inducti o n on the n um b e ro fe l e m en ts o f T .




to b e a rbi tra ry .














N n f i g




.F ro m this i t readily f ol lo ws
that ￿ s
i
2 CPNE (￿; s
Nnf ig
). No w, supp ose s
￿
i
2 CPNE (￿; s
Nnfig















N n f i g






























No w, l et j T j > 1 a nd assu m e tha t w ea l read y pro v ed that for a l l R wi th




it ho l ds that ￿ s
R
2 CP N E( ￿; s
Nn R




2 CPNE (￿ ; s
N n R













). T he n
it re a dil y follo ws fro m the ￿rst p art o f the induct ion h y p othesis tha t ￿ s
R
2




) for a l l R
￿
6=
T . Thi s sho ws that ￿ s
T






is a l so se lf-enforci ng , i. e. s
￿
R

























for all i 2 T , whic h pro v es tha t ￿ s
T
2 CP N E( ￿; s
Nn T
). So , le t i 2 T
be ￿x ed fo r the m om e n t. Th e nr e p eated ap pl ic at i o n o f Link Monoto ni c-











































). Com b i ning the t w o las t (in)eq ua l iti es
















Note that w e wil l ha v e com pl eted the p r oof of the theorem if w e















) for a l l i 2 T ,i t16















) for a l l i 2 T (a nd, con-
seque n tly , s
￿
T
62 CPNE (￿; s
N n T















) f o r all
i 2 T ( an d s
￿
T
2 CP N E( ￿; s
N n T
















). B ecaus e s
￿
T









) for ea c h j 2 T , a nd i tf ol lo ws f ro m the i n-
















) for eac h j 2 T .


























). W e kno wb y rep ea te da p p l ic at i o n of Link

















). H o w ev er, i f this sho ul d

















) the n rep eated appli cation















), whic h con-





































































































) for a l l i 2 T .
Re m ark 3: W eh a v ea n e x am pl eo fa s o l ution satisfyi ng CE , WLS and
IP , for w hi c h CPNE (￿ ) 6= fs j L(s) is essen ti al ly com pl eteg .I n o the rw o rds,
there m a yb es wh i c h is no t in CPNE (￿ ), t h ough L (s) is essen ti ally com ple te.
W e de￿ned the Prop ortional L i nks So l ution ￿
P
in sec tion 2 , a nd p o i n ted out
that i t d o es n ot sa ti sf y W LS. It also turns o ut that the c on c lusions of theorem 2
are no lon ger v alid in the l inki ng ga m e￿ ( ￿
P
). Whil ew e do not ha v ea n y gener al
c ha racte rization results for ￿ (￿
P
), w e sho wb e l o w tha t com pl ete structures wi ll
not nec ess aril y b e coa l iti o npro of equi libri ao f ￿ ( ￿
P
) in the sp e cial case of the
3- pl a y e r m ajority ga m e.
14
1 4
v i sam a jori t y gam ei fa m aj o ri t y coal itio n has w orth 1, and a ll othe r coal iti ons ha v e
ze ro w o r th.17
Prop osit ion 1 L et N b e a pl ay er s e t wi th j N j =3 ,a nd le t v b e the majority
gameo nj N j . Then , s 2 CPNE (￿
P
) i￿ L(s)=ffi; j gg, i.e., only one p a ir o f
age nts for ms a link .









( s ) =
1
2
. C h ec k that i f i dev iates a nd form sa l i nk with k ,t h e ni ’s pa y o￿
rem ai ns a t
1
2
.A lso, cl early i and j tog e ther do no t ha v ea n y pro ￿table d e vi at i on .
He nce, s i sc o ali tionpro of.
No w, supp ose that N i sa c o nnec ted set a c co r di ng to s. Th e re are t w o
p o ssibi liti es.
Case (i ) : L (s)=
￿







for al l i 2 N . Let i an d j
d e v iate and break link sw i th k . Then, b oth i an d j g e tap a y o￿ o f
1
2
. S upp os e
i m ak e s a further devi at ion . The on l y devi at i on wh i c h needs to b e considere d
is i f i re -e s tabli sh e sa l ink with k . Chec k tha t i ’s pa y o￿ r e mains at
1
2
.S o , i n
t h i s c a s e s c a n not b e a co al ition pro of e quil ibri um .
Case (ii) : L(s) 6=
￿
L. Sinc e N i s a conn e cted set in L(s), th e o nl y p os si bili t y
is that there e xist i an d j suc h that b oth a re conn e cted to k , but no t to eac h
other. Then, b o th i and j ha v ea p a y o￿ o f
1
4
. Le t no w i and j de viate, bre ak




. Chec k that neit he r pla y er ha s an y furthe r pro￿tab l e dev iation. A g ain,
this sho w s tha t s is no t coali tionpro o f .
5 W eigh ted P oten tial Gam es
Monderer and Sh aple y (19 93 ) pro v ev arious prop e rtie s of the cl as s of p ote n-
tial games.
1 5
Thei r results m ak e p oten t ial ga m es pa rti cularly in te resting, and
1 5
R ose n thal (1973 )w as the ￿r st to (im pl icitl y) us e p o te n tia l functions fo rg a m es i n s trate -
gi cf orm .18
prom pt us to study the cl a s so fl inki ng g am e s whic h a re also p oten ti al ga m e s.
Le t ￿=( N ; S
1
; : : :;S
n
;￿ ) b eag a m e in strategic form , where for eac h
i 2 N; S
i
i s th e s trategy set of pla y er i,a n d￿ i st he p a y o￿ functi on . Le t




b e av ec to r of p os i tiv en um be rs, to b e call ed weig hts for the






!I R is a w -p ot ent ia l fo r ￿ i f for ev ery i 2 N



































The g am e ￿ is calle da w -p ote ntial g a me i fi ta d m i ts a w -pot en ti al .
Monderer and Shapley (1 99 3) p oin t o ut tha t the argm ax s e to faw eigh te d
pot e n tial do e s not dep end o n a partic ular c hoice of a w e igh ted p o ten tial, and
hence can b e us e d a s an equi libri um re ￿n e m en t. They a l s o rem a rk tha t thi s
re￿ne m en t c o nce pt i s supp orted b y som ee x pe rim e n tal results.
16
Mo re o v e r, the
Fictitious Play pro ce s s con v erges to the e quil ibri um se ti na c las s of g am es that
con tains the ￿nite w e igh ted p oten tial ga m e s.
In thi s secti on , w e ￿rst sho w tha t the cl as s o f we i g hte d Myers on v a l ues
is preci se ly the class of solutions ￿ wh i c h s ati s fy com po ne n te ￿ci ency and
whic hg e nera t el i nking g am e s that are w ei gh ted p oten tial ga m es. Sec o nd, w e
sho w tha t s trategi es in the arg m a x set of th e s e pot e n tial g am e s result in the
form ation of essen ti al ly com pl ete co o p eration structure s.
17
T he sec o nd result,
in conjunction wi th the results o f the previ o us sec tion, s t reng the ns the cas e
for the form ation o f e s sen tiall y com ple te structures i f th e nego ti at i o n pro c ess
is sim ultaneous .
So m em ore de ￿nitions and l em m a s prece d e the m ai n results o f this s e cti on .
1 6
Mo n dere r and Shapl e y (19 93) p oi n t out that th i sm a y b eam er e co i nc i de nce . Se e al so
V a n Huyck e t al . (1990 ) and Cra wfo rd (1 991).
1 7
Thes e r esu l ts gene ral ise ana logo us re sults o fQ i n (19 93), who w as conce rne d onl yw i th
Myerson va l ue s and p ote n ti al gam es.19














(L ) ￿ ￿
j
(Lnffi ;j gg)) (12)
A coali tion S is a p artne r ship in (N; v )i f fo r eac h T
￿
6=
S and e ac h R ￿
N n S ; v( R [ T )=v ( R ) : A solution
18
￿ sa ti s￿es p a rtn ers hip c onsiste ncy i f for









( v ) u
S
￿
for eac h i 2 S:
Kalai an d Sam et (198 8) us e pa rtnershi pc o nsiste nc y as one of t h e con di tions
in thei rc hara c teri zation of the cl as s o f w ei gh ted Sh aple yv al ues.
The nex tl e m m ai ll us tr a tes a n i m p o rtan t pro p ert y of the w ei gh te dM y erson
v alues, a nd is of indep enden ti n tere st .W e rem ind the reader tha t w eigh ted M y-
erson v al ues are w e igh ted Shapley v al ues of the gra ph-restri cted gam e( N; v
g
)
(see pag e 5).
Le m m a3 The we i g hte d Myerson valu e ￿
w
is the u nique r ul e that i sc omp one nt
e￿c ien t and w -fair.
Pro of :W e ￿rst pro v e that ￿
w
sa ti s￿es the t w o prop ert ies m en ti on e d. T o
pro v e c om p onen t e￿c ienc y , let g =( N; L ) b e a co o p eration structure an d le t
S b e a con ne cted com p onen to f L . Then th e as so ciated gam e v
g
can b e spli t




as foll o w s. De￿ne
v
S
(T ): = v
g
( T \ S )
v
N n S
( T ): =v
g
( T n S )






b ec au s e S is a connecte d




Note that here , w e are us i ng the ter m ‘sol ution’ as the rule sp ec i fyi ng pa y o￿s to the
pla y er s fo rc l ass es o f TU g am es.20











) = 0 f o r all i 2 N nS . U sing



































( N )= v
g
( S )= v ( S ) ;
where w e use e￿ cie ncy of t he w eigh te d Shapley v alue i n the thi rd equali t y .
T o pro v e w -fairness, let g =( N; L ) b e a co op eration structure and c ho os e
i; j 2 N suc h that fi ;j g2 L .D e ￿ne
~
L := Lnffi; j gg,~ g =( N;
~
L ), a nd de￿ne




. T he n , fo r eac h T ￿ N with fi; j g6 ￿T
~ v ( T ) =
X
R 2 T n g
v ( R ) ￿
X
R 2 T n ~ g
v ( R )=0 ;
w h e r e w e u s e t h e fact that T ng = T n ~ g . H ence , fi; j g i s a pa rtne rs hi pi n~ v .

















f i ; j g
￿




















































































W en o w sho w that there exi s t sa tm os t o ne rul e that s atis￿es c om p onen te ￿ -




ar e t w o rul es21
sa ti sfying the t w o pro p erti es, a nd let (N; L )b ea c o o p eration struc tu r ew i th a
m i nim um n um b e ro fl inks suc ht h a t ￿
1
( L ) 6 =￿
2
( L ) .L e t f i; j g2 L . Then b y



































































where thel a st equali t y foll o w s from w - fair ne ss of ￿
2






( L ) ￿ ￿
2
i





( L ) ￿ ￿
2
j
( L ) ) ( 1 3 )
I t can b e eas i ly seen tha t eq ua l it y (13 ) ho l ds for all i ;j that are in the s am e
connecte d com p o nen to f ( N; L ). Th e refore, w e can ￿nd fo r e ac h connecte d










(L ))= d ( S ) (14)




ar e c om p onen te ￿ cie n ts o l ut ion s, so for eac h con-












( L )= v ( S ) (15)
No w, com bi ning (1 4) and (1 5), w e ￿nd that d (S )= 0 f o r e ac h connecte d





W en o w sho wt h a tw ei gh ted My erso n v alues a re th e on ly so l utions whic ha r e
com pon e n te ￿ci en t a nd whi c h gene ra te li nking ga m es that are w e igh ted p o-
ten tial g am e s . This fol lo ws from the previ o us lem m a and the foll o wi ng le m m a.22
Le m m a4 L et ￿ b eac omp o n en t e￿c ien t solut i on ge ne r ating a link ing game
￿(￿ ) that is a we ighte dp oten tial game. Then the r e exist we ights w suc h that ￿
is w - fair .
Pro of : Sinc e the li nki n g gam e￿ ( ￿ ) i saw e igh ted p oten t ial gam e, w e can ￿nd
p o siti v ew eigh ts w and a w - p oten ti al P
w
f o r t h e g am e￿ ( ￿ ) .W e wil l show that
￿ is w -fa i r. Let L b e a co o p eration s truc ture a nd l et i; j 2 N .W ed e ￿ne for
all k 2 N s
k


























b ecause all these stra te g y tuple s result in the form ati o n o f the sam e co op eration






































































( L ) ￿ ￿
j
( L nffi; j gg )
￿
This pro v es that ￿ i s w -fa i r.
The foll o wing le m m a sho ws tha t eac hw ei gh ted My erson v alue g e nera t es a
li nki ng ga m e that is a w e igh ted p oten tial ga m e .
Le m m a5 The link ing game ￿(￿
w
) is a w -p ote ntial game .
Pro of : See the ap p endi x.23
Co m bini ng the results w eh a v e o btained so far, w e o btain our c h aracteri za-
ti o n o f the c l a s so fw e igh ted My erson v alue s.
T h e o r e m 3 Let ￿ b e a com pon e n te ￿ci en t solution. Then, the li nki ng ga m e
￿(￿ )i sa w ei gh te d p oten ti a l gam ei ￿ ￿ is a w ei gh ted My erso n v alue.
Re m ark 4: Mond e rer and Sha pl ey (199 3) consider p ar t icip ation gam es,
stra t eg i c form g am es i nw h i c he a c hp l ay er h as the option of eit he r co op erating
with al l the o the r pla y ers or b eing on his o wn. Suc h a gam ei si nf ac t a link ing
ga m e in whic h the stra te gy se to fap l a y er i i sl im ited to t w o stra te gi es, ; and
N nfig. Monderer an d Sha pl ey pro v et h e the or e m s tated a b o v eu s i ng thei r
v ersion o f the link ing g am e. Ho w e v e r, the sev ere r estricti on on the pla y ers’
stra t eg y se ts i m pli es t h at the pa rti ci pa ti on ga m e s are of l im ited i n tere st .
N o t e t h a t i n t he or e m1 , w e pro v ed that if ￿ satis￿es CE, WL S and IP ,
then ￿ s
i
is a we ak ly dom in ating st ra te g y in ￿(￿ ). Noting tha t w ei gh t ed My erson
v alues satisfy these pro p erti es a nd an y n-tuple o f w eakly do m inating s trategi es
m us t b e in the argm ax s e t o f the c o rre sp ond i ng w e igh ted p o te n tial gam e, w e
obta i n the ￿rst pa rt of th e fo l lo wing theo re m .
Theore m4 Let w b e a set of p os i tiv ew eigh ts and l et P
w
be a w eigh te d
pot e n tial for the l ink ing g am e￿ ( ￿
w
). Then ￿ s 2 arg m ax P
w
. Moreo v er, i f s 2
argm ax P
w




Re m ark 5: One can construct exam pl es showi ng that the second sta te m en t
of theo re m4 c a nnot b e strengthened. That is, if L(s) is essen ti al ly c om pl ete
for ￿
w




The pr oof of t he la t ter ha lf o f the the o re m i s sim il ar to the corr esp o nd i ng part of the
pro of of theore m 1, and is the refore om i tte d.24
Conc lusi on
In thi s p ap er, w eh a v e stud i ed the e ndo genous form ati on o f c o op er ation str uc -
tur es in sup er a dditi v eT U - gam es us i ng a strategic ga m e a pproa c h. I n thi s
stra t eg i c ga m e ,e ac hp l a y e r anno unce s the s e to fp l a y e rs with w hom he or s he
w an ts to form a l ink ,a n d a l ink is f or m ed i f b oth pl a y e rs w an t to form t he l ink.
Giv en the resulti ng co o p eration s truc ture, the pa y o￿s are dete rm ine db ys o m e
ex o genous so l ution f o r co op erativ eg a m e s with co op eration structure s. W eh a v e
c o nce n tra te d on the cl a s so fs o l utions sa ti sf ying three a pp eali ng prop e rtie s. W e
ha v e sho wn that i n thi s setting b oth the und om i na te dN as h e quil ibri um and the
Co ali tion-P r o o f Nash Equi li brium predic t the form ation of the f ul l co op eration
structure or som ep a y o ￿ equi v al en t structure.
W e also co nsi de red l inki n g ga m es tha t are w e igh ted p o te n tial g am es and
thei r argm ax sets. I t turned o ut tha t, under a n e￿c ienc yr e quire m en t, the
cl a ss of soluti o ns generating l inki ng g am e s tha t a re w ei gh ted p o te n ti a l ga m es
is the class o f w eigh te dM y erso n v alue s. F urther, the a rgm ax set of the link ing
ga m es that are w e igh ted p oten ti al gam es pre di cts the form ation of the full
co o p eration struc tu re o r so m ep a y o￿ eq uiv alen t struct ur e .
The results obta i ned i nt h i s pa p er all p oin t in the direc tion o f th e form ation
of the ful l co o p eration structure i n a sup eradd i tiv ee n vi ro nm en t. Ho w ev e r, as
indi cated i n th e tex t, the s e results are sensi tiv e to the ass um ptions on so l utions
for co op e ra ti v e gam e with co op eration structure s that w em ade in the pa p er.
F urther, the discussion in sec tion 3 sho w s that i n a con tex t where link sa r e
form ed seque n tial ly rather tha n sim ultaneous l yo t he rp r e dict ion s m a y pre v ai l.25
App endi x
W e pro vide her et he p r oof o f l em m a5 . T o sim pli fy th i s p r oof , w er e call
so m e results o f Kalai and Sam e t (198 8) a nd w e pro v ea n i n term e di ary claim .
Kalai a nd Sam e t (19 88) ga v e the foll o wi ng pro babil istic de￿ni tion of the






















where ￿(N ) denotes the set o f p erm utations of N , PR
￿
i
= f j 2 N j ￿
￿ 1
( j ) <
￿
￿ 1
( i ) g de no te s the set o f prede cesso rs of pl a y e r i acc o rdi ng t o ￿, and where
for ea c h ￿ 2 ￿(N ) the pro babil it y p
w
















With re spe c tt o t h e pro babil iti es p
w
(￿ )w e deri v e the foll o wing result, whic h
pla y sa ni m p o rtan t role i n the pro of of l em m a5 .
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Pro of :T o sim plif y the pro of w ei n tro duce so m e no tation. F or ￿ 2 ￿(N ) and
k 2 N w en a m eN n ( PR
￿
k
[f k g ) the tail o f k in ￿ .W es i m ply sa y that T is a






= S [f j g )=p
w
( N n ( S[f i; j g) is the tail of i in ￿ )
W ed e no te the set N n (S [f i; j g)b yN
￿ Si j
. U sing this no tati o n and con di -





is the ta i lo f i j N
￿ Si j




is a tail )26







k 2S [fi;j g
w
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i s a ta i l ) (A: 1)

















i s a ta i l) (A: 2)
Co m bini ng ex press i on s (A. 1 ) and (A .2) g i v e s the desi red result.
Le m m a 5 The link ing game ￿(￿
w
) is a w - p ote ntial game .
Pro of : W e wil l pro v e that for the g am e￿ ( ￿
w
) , f o ri ; j 2 N ; s
￿ ij
2 ￿




























































= 0 (A. 3)

































). I t can b e sho wn a nalogo usly to the or e m 2.8 o f Mon de rer and
Shap l ey (199 3) tha t the prop e rt yd e sc rib ed in (A. 3) i s s atis￿ed i f a nd on l yi f
￿ ( ￿
w
) i s a w -p oten ti al ga m e .
T o pro v e that (A .3) i ss a t i s￿ e d, w e us e the pro babil istic de￿ni tion of the
w ei gh ted Shapley v al ue ￿
w
of Kalai a nd Sam et (1 98 8). T o sim pl ify no tations




.W e consider, for






















































[f i g )
￿
;27




( T ) for a l l T ￿ N
that do not c on tai n i.W ec a n g o throug h the s am e pro c edure fo r the o the r
































































R e a r rang i ng the term s, w e o btain
￿=
X

































































( S )= v
c
( S )= v
d
( S ) fo r all S ￿
N nfi; j g and w e o btain
￿ =
P
































































[f j g )
￿
This l as t e x press i o n c a nb es e en to b e equal to 0 if w ec o nsider the term sp e r
stra t eg y pro￿le . Let ￿ 2f a; b ;c ;d g a nd cons i der
X
































[f j g )
￿
This is equal to
X
S ￿ N nf i;j g
v
￿
(S [f i ;j g )
￿
X
￿ 2 ￿(N ): PR
￿
i


















No w, w e u se the c laim , a nd conclude that the las t e xpression e qua l s0 .28
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